Economic, social, and institutional determinants of domestic conflict in fragile States
Abstract
In this article, we use Fixed Effect Poisson Regression (FEPR) with robust standard errors, to study the economic, social, and institutional determinants of internal conflict in 58 fragile states over the period 2004 to 2017. We show that effective institutions (measured by judicial effectiveness) and higher incomes can help reduce conflict in these countries. By contrast, democracy does not seem to mitigate violence, with democratic experiences generally showing an increase in conflicts in fragile countries. It also appears that human capacity development does not contribute to conflict reduction. This implies that fragile states must first improve the social, economic, and institutional conditions of their population before they can reap the benefits of political reforms and of education. The same is true for economic reforms in the context of globalization, which also do not seem to help reduce violence in fragile countries.
Domains
Economics and FinanceOrigin | Files produced by the author(s) |
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