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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2017

Verifiable Private Polynomial Evaluation

Résumé

Delegating the computation of a polynomial to a server in a verifiable way is challenging. An even more challenging problem is ensuring that this polynomial remains hidden to clients who are able to query such a server. In this paper, we formally define the notion of Private Polynomial Evaluation (PPE). Our main contribution is to design a rigorous security model along with relations between the different security properties. We define polynomial protection (PP), proof unforgeability (UNF), and indistinguishability against chosen function attack (IND-CFA), which formalizes the resistance of a PPE against attackers trying to guess which polynomial is used among two polynomials of their choice. As a second contribution, we give a cryptanalysis of two PPE schemes of the literature. Finally, we design a PPE scheme called PIPE and we prove that it is PP-, UNF-and IND-CFA-secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
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Dates et versions

hal-01689825 , version 1 (22-01-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01689825 , version 1

Citer

Xavier Bultel, Manik Lal Das, Hardik Gajera, David Gérault, Matthieu Giraud, et al.. Verifiable Private Polynomial Evaluation. 11th International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec 2017), Oct 2017, Xi'an, China. pp.487-506. ⟨hal-01689825⟩
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